Hyderabad: On 17 December, a three-member bench of the special court, headed by the Peshawar High Court Chief Justice Waqar Ahmad Seth, pronounced a death sentence for the former President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf. The court found Musharraf guilty of high treason for abrogating the Constitution and imposing an extra-constitutional emergency in Pakistan in November 2007.
In the detailed judgment released two days later, the judges also came out strongly against the Pakistan Army. Justice Seth wrote in the verdict, “It is unbelievable and unimaginable that such an extreme act is committed alone by a single man in uniform, the then Corps Commanders Committee, in addition to all uniformed officers who were guarding him each and every time, with boots on, are equally and fully involved in the act and deeds of the accused person."
Musharraf, who has been in exile since 2016, is unlikely to face the hangman anytime soon.
Still, the verdict could have far-reaching implications on the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan. I use the word ‘could’ because it is now wholly dependent on the politicians of Pakistan whether they see this as an opportunity to escape from under the military’s domination of the political landscape.
The special court has shown the way. In the past, Pakistani courts have been accused of consenting to the frequent takeover of the country by the army, quoting the 'Doctrine of Necessity'. This doctrine states that an extra-constitutional authority can take over a government for the good of the people.
Pakistan’s Supreme Court justified the military coup by General Zia ul Haq that overthrew the elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. The Supreme Court made a similar decision in Musharraf's coup against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
The judiciary is now asserting itself. Last month, the Supreme Court blocked the three-year extension granted to the Army Chief General Bajwa by Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Taken together, the two verdicts send a clear signal to the Pakistan Army that it is not above the law.
Obviously, this would not go down well with Pakistan Army.
Husain Haqqani, in his book 'Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military', writes about Professor Aqil Shah, who interviewed 100 military officers between 2007 and 2013. Three-fourths of the officers viewed a coup as a legitimate form of regime change under 'crisis' conditions, and that civilian politicians were incapable of managing national security.
The Pakistan Army does not want to lose its dominant position in influencing national policy, and the Director-General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) was first off the block after the verdict against Musharraf.
In a press release, the ISPR expressed “pain and anguish by rank and file of the Pakistan Armed Forces” and opined that “due legal process seems to have been ignored”. This is a remarkable statement for any military to make in a democracy as if the pain of the armed forces is justification enough to question the legal process.
Unfortunately, the political leadership in Pakistan has not taken this occasion to assert its authority over the military. After the ISPR press release, the Pakistan Attorney General held a press conference and announced, “The requirements for a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution were not fulfilled in the Musharraf high treason case and the verdict was illegal. It is not only that a fair trial must be held but also that it is seen to be fair”.
The pressure from the Pakistan Army on the government was evident.
It is obvious that the verdict will be challenged in the Supreme Court. The key will be to watch how the political leadership of Pakistan responds to this.
The history of Pakistan Army’s domination is unlikely to be overturned in a hurry, but there is an opportunity here to start making some corrections in the dysfunctional civil-military relations in the country. The ball is now in Imran Khan’s court.
