New Delhi: The sudden aggressive stance of China’s PLA soldiers on its southern periphery with India has got several dimensions including strategic and tactical one. By no means is it a random ‘transgression’ like thousands of times in the past when patrolling squads of Indian and Chinese soldiers walk past the respective perceptions of an unresolved border, often leading to minor rows.
Neither has it taken the Indian establishment by surprise. Certain preceding developments had ensured that such a pass would come soon. Similarly, nor is the inclusion of Gilgit-Baltistan in India’s weather forecast from May 7 onwards by the state-owned Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) based on a random whim or bureaucratic oversight.
But from here on, the going is to be tough as the two nuclear-armed Asian giants engage in a game of strategy and counter-strategy.
Several developments have contributed to the escalating situation at the border.
Firstly, India and China have an unresolved border at several points, a legacy of the past. There is no clear well-demarcated border. The militaries of both sides patrol according to their respective perceptions of where the border is.
Secondly, it is now India’s turn to at least match up to the Chinese infrastructure already up in place in the high-altitude India-China frontier. From the military standpoint, India must ramp up military infrastructure because to deploy forces at the high altitude frontier with China, troops will have to undergo several stages of acclimatisation. The facilities and logistical requirements leave a lot to be desired at the moment either near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or at locations from which strikes and counter-strikes can be launched.
For India, the task is not an easy one. China has the advantage of higher ground in most areas. The terrain on the Chinese side, although situated on a high plateau, is relatively flat, while the Indian side is very mountainous and craggy.
Thirdly and very importantly, Chinese military theorists envisage a border war with India as one of the five major conflict war scenarios possible. PLA military thinkers term this particular scenario as the ‘Joint Border Area Operations’.
China strongly believes that in a possible border war, India would be unlikely to attack or provoke an attack until it had amassed superior numbers of soldiers and equipment at its forward bases. And for that roads and other infrastructure would be vital. So while India will try its utmost to construct and improve infrastructure in the region, China will try to thwart and delay it for as long as possible as it secures and consolidates its existing military infrastructure even more.
Fourthly, while China built road heads and railheads to many points right up to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the de facto border, India is a very late starter at this.
After adopting a government policy of not developing infrastructure in the border with China, India reversed its policy in 2007 and decided to construct 73 ‘strategically important’ Indo-China Border Roads (ICBR) to facilitate the brisk movement of troops in case of any aggression along the frontier with China.
Of these 73, the most crucial roads are 61 which were entrusted to the Border Roads Organisation (BRO). Of these 61, only 22 ICBRs were completed until 2016. But after that road-building had been frenetic. All roads will be completed by 2022 and that is what makes this year and the next extremely critical.
Fifthly, vitals roads have been laid. One of the most important stretches is the recently opened road that connects to Lipulekh, near the India-China-Nepal trijunction. Another one that was completed in 2019 is the 255-km long road connecting Shyok village to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), a major Indian military base, which is located near the Karakoram pass.
Sixthly, road laying and improved connectivity have enabled Indian military patrols to move fast to more locations in the region. This has increased chances of more encounters with PLA patrols which had already been using vehicles from much earlier years.
Seventhly, India's position on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Aksai Chin in Ladakh has undergone a planned and paradigmatic change. Soon after the August 5, 2019 abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, India's home, defence, foreign ministers and the Army chief pronounced in precise tandem that Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) belongs to India as does Aksai Chin in Ladakh.
By highlighting the PoK issue, India sought to point out that there is a dispute over PoK on the other side of the Line of Control (LoC) too. It is through PoK's Gilgit-Baltistan that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is laid. CPEC gives much easier access to China to West Asia—a Chinese dream for long. China also seeks an alternative route to the oil-rich Gulf rather than the long and unsafe sea route where navies of powerful countries prowl.
Eighth, because of the close strategic Pakistan-China linkage, any Indian initiation of action on the LoC will stimulate escalation on the LAC, because any action which threatens the status quo at LoC also threatens Chinese interest. It also renders redundant India’s existent twin strategy of adopting two different approaches for the LoC and the LAC. This is also because China understands India’s marked reluctance to have a situation simultaneously on two fronts.
Ninthly, Indian strategic thinking recognises the fact that it is China that is trying to encircle India and not Pakistan. International developments have rendered Pakistan to the status of a ‘client state’ of China and have also reduced its significance as far as India is concerned, thereby acknowledging that the long term threat is China and not Pakistan. That may be the reason why India is more focused on ramping up infrastructure in its periphery with China.
Tenthly, China has increased its points of engagement with India from Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh to the India-China-Nepal and the India-China-Bhutan trijunctions. In effect, India faces a potential militarily torrid situation all across its long northern border. Although, whether it is wise on part of China to open up so many points on such a wide front from Arunachal to Ladakh is a question time will answer.
However, international diplomacy and strategy can never operate in a vacuum. Developments on Taiwan, the role of the United States, and more importantly, whether India can win back the trust of Nepal and Bhutan will be key factors to determine with what intensity the India-China ties head.
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