Hyderabad: All eyes are currently focused on India's northern borders in Ladakh, where there is an ongoing standoff with Chinese soldiers who have reportedly intruded across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It is hoped that the matter can be peacefully settled between the two countries, although it does not appear headed for an early resolution.
Much has already been written about the current situation on the border, and I, therefore, want to focus on the broader issue of the management of the LAC.
In 2019, there were 663 recorded Chinese transgressions across the LAC. As reported in The Indian Express, this was a significant rise from the 404 transgressions in 2018. We often express satisfaction at the fact that there has not been a single shot fired at the LAC since 1975, but increasing assertiveness by both sides at the borders could lead to a breakdown of restraint that escalates to an unintended crisis. It would be appropriate at this time to comprehensively review the procedures and protocols for border management so that flashpoints can be avoided while simultaneously ensuring the sanctity of the LAC.
The Group of Ministers set up after the Kargil Review Committee had gone into various aspects of national security, including border management. Their report had noted:
At present there are instances of more than one force working on the same border and questions of conflict in command and control have been raised frequently. Multiplicity of forces on the same border has also led to lack of accountability on the part of the forces. To enforce the accountability, the principle of ‘one border one force’ may be adopted while considering deployment of forces at the border.”
Currently, both the army and the ITBP are deployed along the LAC, carrying out similar activities of patrolling, surveillance, and responding to transgressions. The responsibility for border management is vested with the ITBP, but in any confrontation, like in the past at Depsang, Chumar, and Doklam, or as is being witnessed currently, it is the Indian Army that leads the primary response. All meetings with the Chinese at the LAC, ceremonial or crisis-driven, are led by army officers.
An unsettled border having two separate forces, each reporting to different ministries, each with separate capability development plans, hampers efficient employment of resources and muddles accountability. Disputed borders should be the responsibility of the army that has greater capability to handle complex situations, and the ITBP placed under its operational control. Such an arrangement already exists at the Line of Control with Pakistan, where the BSF is operating under the control of the army.
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A serious push must be given to improving our ability to ensure comprehensive surveillance over the border. The terrain and weather are forbidding, and a lack of roads limits our ability to physically monitor the LAC with the desired frequency. It was reported in January 2018 that the Chinese had constructed a 1.25 km road across the LAC in the Tuting area of Arunachal Pradesh. Due to the remoteness of the area, the construction came to our notice only when reported by local youth.
An electronic and visual border surveillance network must be put in place using radars, long-range cameras, and radio monitoring devices. This should be backed by aerial surveillance using manned and unmanned systems and satellite imagery. Detection of unusual movement of forces across the LAC is a prerequisite for planning a swift and coherent response. Once the Chinese soldiers cross the LAC, we will be faced with difficult choices, as we are witnessing at Pangong Tso.
It is also time for India and China to revisit the protocols for managing incidents along the LAC. There are numerous agreements that have been signed, and they all call for self-restraint, non-use of force, and refraining from any provocative actions along the LAC. While these have not entirely failed, on the ground there is an increasing tendency to disregard the laid down protocols. This has led to soldiers behaving in a shockingly unmilitary fashion, hurling abuses, and blows at each other.
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We could start with a set of rules for patrolling in what are considered disputed areas. These could range from a moratorium on patrolling to a system of joint patrolling, with many variations in between. It will not be easy to arrive at decisions in all areas, but any reduction in faceoffs between the two armies will make an overall contribution to a calmer LAC. In addition, there must be a strict personal code of conduct for soldiers. It is appalling to see men in uniform wielding sticks.
A conflict along our northern borders will be damaging to both India and China. However, the mere threat of a conflict will not prevent the Chinese military from exploiting chinks in our LAC management. These gaps need to be cemented quickly.
(The author, who led the 'surgical strike' in 2016, was the Northern Army Commander at the time. Pertinently, the Ladakh region comes under the Army's Northern Command)
