Hyderabad: Amid the Taliban's takeover in Afghanistan, eyes are keen on East Asian country China. The US troops withdrawal from war-ravaged Afghanistan after 20 years has ended up in escalated tensions in the country. Meanwhile, China's policy, strategy and worldview vis-à-vis the Taliban, Afghanistan and the wider Islamic world has gained momentum.
China's tryst with Taliban between 1996 and 2001
Being the country's neighbour, China has been enduring decades-long relationships with Afghanistan. China shares Afghanistan's border along the end of Wakhan Corridor in the northwest of the Chinese autonomous province of Xinjiang. Accordingly, Beijing has been keen on preventing conflict in Afghanistan.'
Tracing back the era of Soviet occupation, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) provided support in terms of training, arms, military advisors and finances to the Mujahideen resistance alongside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Several thousands of these mujahideen militants were trained in camps inside Xinjiang. China's high-grade military equipment including machine guns and surface-to-air missiles worth up to US $ 400 million outshined mujahideen camps.
While the Afghan mujahideen formed the Taliban in the early 1990s, China shared a rapport with the group already. During the Taliban's rule in 1996, Beijing maintained low-level engagement with the group through diplomacy, ensuring safety and stability at its border. Reports suggested that the Talian was extended support from Beijing after the US' cruise missile attack on Afghani militant bases. They reportedly provided access to a missile computer guidance system.
As the Taliban's strongholds in the country bolstered, Beijing signed a military pact to train Afghan pilots in 1998 as well as signed economic cooperation agreement in 1999. Meanwhile, China's ties with the Taliban is attributed to the belief that better relations with the group would curb illicit activity including terrorism and drug trafficking. Further, the bilateral ties would deter the Taliban from supporting Uyghur Muslim rebels in Xinjiang—which China considered a major internal security threat.
Following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Xinjiang province shared borders with eight states out of which five were Islamic. It made Beijing wary of the support they could provide to Muslim or Islamic rebellion within Xinjiang.
Reiterating China's goal to deter the Taliban from supporting Uyghurs in Afghanistan and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Beijing ventured to set up an embassy in Kabul and meet the Taliban's head Mullah Omar in 2008. The Taliban turned the table for formal recognition of their government and prevention of sanctions against the regime. However, the deal turned futile as the Taliban refused to oust ETIM and Beijing refused to block sanctions.
China lashed back with an anti-Islamic-fundamentalist alliance” with Central Asian states—Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—to “isolate the Islamic revolt in Xinjiang and prevent movement of Muslim rebels across the region’s borders”.
The Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, on the other hand, the Sino-Central Asian alliance evolved as the “Shanghai Five”, aimed at securing their borders, controlling religious extremist forces and building confidence between Beijing and the former Soviet satellite states. In 2001, China led the path towards this alliance’s formal institutionalization as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Gradually, China operated through the SCO to maximise its economic and security interests in Afghanistan.
Also read: Is the famed resistance of Panjshir Valley becoming history?
Pragmatic hedging strategy post 9/11
The 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States brought a twist to China's relation with the Taliban. Beijing’s formal Taliban engagement and hedging strategy turned no more sustainable. China outwardly supported the US war on terror, on the other hand, informal, clandestine links continued with the Taliban through Pakistan. These links were principally aimed to serve Chinese economic interests in the region as well as maintaining stability in Xinjiang.
Reports suggested that the Taliban may have received Chinese-made weapons via Iran, while analysts raised suspicions that the Haqqani-led group had intentionally kept attacks away from Chinese infrastructure projects (like the MesAynak copper mine outside Kabul, in which China invested US$ 3 billion in 2007 under a 30-year lease agreement). Such a pragmatic hedging strategy put light on China’s broader approach of balance towards the West Asia/Middle East, where it has sought to build somewhat equi-cordial ties with all states.
However, developments in the last few years led to the emergence of Beijing as a critical role player in Afghanistan's future. China–Taliban summits in 2018 and 2019 witnessed bolstering associations between both the countries, as the Trump administration negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban. Notably, the nine-member Taliban delegation travelled to China to seek Beijing’s advice on Trump’s proposed deal for a peace framework—demonstrating China’s considerable influence over the Islamist group.
Xi Jinping’s dreamt of “national rejuvenation” of the Chinese kingdom. Beijing embarked on a grand strategy that sought to firmly establish China as a global great power. It thus undertook not only expanded economic engagement and developmental aid lending, but also an expansion of security interests to protect such investments. This further extended China’s geo-political clout. Deepening engagement with Afghanistan came under such a strategic calculus, albeit with a degree of pragmatism.
Legitimising Taliban
Since the rapid US withdrawal from Afghanistan under President Joe Biden, Beijing has been forthcoming (rather welcomed) in its support to the Taliban regime in the country. It is important to note that China’s positive overture is a special case: Beijing is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
In essence, despite its apprehensions over a resurgence of instability due to Taliban-supported terrorism, Beijing has officially stated that it is prepared to work with the Taliban.
Taliban is first and foremostly drawn (and heavily) on China’s great power competition with the US. Unlike before, when China could feasibly stay out of Afghanistan and make it a low-priority in its national strategy, engagement with the country is now becoming an important part of Beijing’s efforts to credibly establish itself as the unparalleled great power (if not superpower) in the region.
Previously, China’s interest in Afghanistan was low key not only because of the turmoil in the nation, but also because it was unwilling to play a “subordinate role” in the nation under the dominance of the US.
Beijing had to prioritize focusing towards Central Asia, Northeast Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia including South Asia in order to build its authoritative base across Asia.
China–Taliban ties continue to evolve and move in a positive trajectory. China has the first-hand experience of the Taliban continuing to tacitly support Uyghurs and the ETIM and it will be wary of the group resorting to such tactics once it has received recognition from Beijing.
BEIJING’S WORLDVIEW VIS-À-VIS THE TALIBAN
Beijing has continuously expanded its relationship with countries in the West Asia/Middle East, including solidifying its ties with Iran (and Pakistan in South Asia), Chinese power is yet to emerge as an effective (or credible) power in the mind of the wider Islamic world. A stronger connection with the Taliban might allow China to build credence gradually in this regard.
China–Pakistan “iron” brotherhood will allow Islamabad to emerge as a trump card for Beijing in its outreach to Kabul. Ultimately, China could achieve more infrastructure-driven success than the US in Afghanistan on the grounds of its extensive leverage with Pakistan. However, China is unlikely to push the BRI haphazardly in an unstable Afghanistan: some semblance of peace before such an investment is crucial to China. Taliban’s return to power could mark an increased presence of ISIS—which has already shown its presence in the country via two suicide bomb attacks at Kabul airport in the week following Taliban’s return38—and Uyghur extremists which could trickle into China itself via the Wakhan Corridor, posing instability challenges in China’s Xinjiang.
Importantly, Beijing has its own insecurities over rehashing US’ mistakes in the country especially as it is openly targeting the same following the return of Taliban.
For Beijing, the bigger challenge will be to deal with a “fractious Afghanistan”, particularly when the Taliban have a sympathetic and supportive stance towards an extremist Islamist group that has backed and offered sanctuary to Al-Qaeda.
Overall, Beijing’s policies towards Afghanistan highlight its worldview on global leadership wherein it is poised to place its national interests over human security and human rights.
Beijing would not want to lose an opportunity to strengthen its presence in Afghanistan—and West Asia/Middle East and South Asia—and make it increasingly a part of its broader “Eurasia” game plan, and aim to excel where Washington did not.
Afghanistan will be crucial to China’s Eurasian outreach as well and its potential legitimization of governance via a possible full inclusion in China-led ventures like the SCO cannot be entirely ruled out even though it looks far away at present.
China’s fear is associated with the radical groups in Xinjiang and in adjacent regions in Central Asia, particularly with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) that have possibly close linkages with the Uyghurs.
While Taliban-related issues will undoubtedly test Beijing’s evolving worldview vis-à-vis the Islamic world, it is emerging as the main defender or campaigner as P-5 member of the UNSC to internationalize and legitimize the Taliban as a political group, and more importantly, helping Afghanistan to become an “Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan” under the Taliban.
