The clash in Galwan Valley was undoubtedly the worst clash between India and China in the last 45 years. But over the past three decades, both countries had constructed an elaborate mechanism of agreements and protocols to manage the contesting claims on the boundary and took justifiable pride in the fact that it was the longest, but peaceful - disputed border in the world. Not a shot had been fired across these borders for over three decades. One can go further and state that China would not do well in the longer run, without India playing an active, positive and partnering role. In an exclusive interview with ETV Bharat Alka Acharya, a professor of Chinese studies, spoke on the various aspects of China's foreign policy vis-à-vis India. Excerpts from the interview:
Q1. Was the clash in Galwan valley on July 15th the worst in 45 years? What was the immediate reason for the clash? What exactly happened on that night?
A1: The clash in Galwan Valley was undoubtedly the worst clash between India and China in the last 45 years. This was the first time that major casualties occurred on both sides as a result of the armed personnel coming face to face with each other along contested LAC. Both India and China had, over the past three decades constructed an elaborate mechanism of agreements and protocols to manage the contesting claims on the boundary and took justifiable pride in the fact that it was the longest, but peaceful - disputed border in the world. Not a shot had been fired across these borders for over three decades.
Q2. The Prime Minister says that there is no intrusion from China. But, later he clarified that there was an attempt to intrude into Indian territory. The opposition parties have contested Modi’s statement and his handling of the dispute. What is your view?
A2: There has certainly been a great deal of controversy generated as a consequence of the Prime Minister’s statement at the All Parties Meet on 19th June. The subsequent unprecedented clarification that was issued by the PMO witnessed the hue and cry from some opposition parties. It must be kept in mind that no official statement about what was happening in eastern Ladakh had been issued since early May when skirmishes and scuffles all along the border simultaneously, in several areas, had taken place. However, the matter was being furiously debated in the newspapers and news channels from early May onwards. Besides, satelllite images (freely available from commercial operators as well as foreign intelligence sources) provided visuals which appeared to belie the position that was being projected by the government.
In my view, this was most unfortunate – because it not only generated much confusion (including the perception that an attempt was being made to obfuscate or cover up the actual situation) but also led to a needless division within the strategic community. The situation was followed by a great deal of bickering on social media and even some unnecessary negative aspersions being cast on those who sought clarification in this regard – thereby reducing the importance of the debate and discussion in the matter.
Q3. There is a loud call going on in the social media and also in the prime time television news bulletins to boycott the Chinese goods. Is this practical on the economic front? If so, will it be useful to strengthen India’s position?
A3: Call for boycott of 'Chinese' goods are not new on the 'nationalistic' stage. We have seen this outcry for the past many years whenever India-China border controversy surfaced, and during the 72-day Doklam standoff in particular. But the impact on the consumption and purchasing behaviour has generally been short-lived. The Galwan clash has however brought forth a qualitatively new emotive intensity – not just from the general public but also from some Traders Associations and some political worthies as well.
There are calls for imposing trade sanctions, some state governments have put Chinese projects 'on hold'. There are demands for greater scrutiny of how and where this investment is going and calls to block Huawei’s bid for the 5G network. The casual calls for boycott do not appear to have a complete grasp of what it means to be the biggest importer of Chinese consumer goods. There is a blithe disregard for the structural mismatch between the manufacturing strengths and industrial capacity of the two economies. The question is no longer whether we can do without China - the point is that this economic engagement has become so inter-penetrated as to be almost inescapable. China in fact is the fastest growing source of FDI into India – so that attempting to 'decouple' the two economies will come with prohibitive costs. It will push the Indian growth story back by half a decade at least at conservative estimates, and that too, if we are able to find alternative sources of investment immediately. Above all, let us not lose sight of the fact that India is the big market in Asia and losing it will undoubtedly be a setback to a post-Covid China. This is a leverage that India must not discard in its nationalist outrage – the anti-China sentiment should not completely blind us to the bargaining power that we could exploit to our possible advantage.
Q4. China has taken up many developmental initiatives (including the Belt and Road Initiative) in neighbouring countries such as Sri Lanka and Nepal. What is China’s strategy? How has India’s attitude been to countries in our neighbourhood?
A4: China’s infrastructure-building activities in India’s neighbourhood, particularly those which have a bearing on security issues and which have the potential to effect a transformation in strategic terms, have raised considerable unease within the security establishment in India. China’s construction of the Chittagong port (Bangladesh), which directly borders the northeast region of India, the Hambantota Deep Sea port (Sri Lanka) and the Gwadar Port (Pakistan) only added to the concerns and fears of being encircled by China. Xi Jinping is going ahead by linking the Chinese Dream to an Asian dream, founded upon connectivity, trade, investments and common prosperity.
China has sought to leverage its continental and maritime geography in transforming the geopolitical realities in Central, South and South East Asia. The extremely ambitious 'Belt and Road Initiative'(BRI) is a long-term initiative and is the core of the evolving Chinese foreign policies vis-à-vis its neighbours, marked by economic cooperation and people to people exchange. It signifies a shift in China’s role from trade partner to investment partner - and is the key to understanding China and its future role in Asia. Essentially, we are witnessing what has been dubbed the “transportation revolution” in Asia and China is right at its core. The mantra of connectivity across the seas and land has found a fair measure of resonance with India’s neighbors.
So far, India has refused to be part of the BRI on account of territorial sovereignty issues, especially with regard to China Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC). But the situation is changing far more rapidly. As the largest economy in the region, it is clear that India should be playing a leading role in regional development and modernisation. Further, India requires a stable region if it wishes to play a bigger role on the world stage. A divisive, tension-ridden or fractured neighbourhood would pull India down. One can go further and state that China would not do well in the longer run, without India playing an active, positive and partnering role. China could significantly contribute towards bringing about development, growth and modernization opportunities to South Asia, but this would have to be done in tandem with India, not just pragmatically, but also strategically.
Q5. China claims authority over the entire Galwan valley region. What will be the consequence of this in future?
A5: This is an extremely serious development and has already led to many calls for a serious revision of the framework of India’s China policy. It has also led to questions regarding China’s intentions and many have criticized what is being increasingly described as India’s policy of 'appeasement' towards China – which to my mind is highly unwarranted.
A dangerous tactical outcome is that hundreds of Indian and Chinese troops are now amassing on the LAC in the Galwan Valley and will remain stationed till the 'disengagement' has concluded to the satisfaction of both sides – possibly leading to a permanent presence. Strategically, it strengthens China’s control over that area – since it brings the Chinese PLA in a commanding position vis-a-vis not just the Galwan River, but – at its junction with the Shyok River and above all, the critically important Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) highway that connects the Indian army with the rest of Ladakh. A longer-term problem, which we need to observe carefully, is what kind of intervention will be witnessed by China in the J&K issue. There is no doubt that there are greater apprehensions on the Chinese side about the Indian intentions with regard to Aksai Chin. This is therefore a potentially tension-ridden scenario and will only fuel the distrust on both sides.
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Q6. Trump in a statement expressed concern over the Indo-China dispute and said that he is communicating with both countries. What role can the US or any other country play in this dispute?
A6: This is entirely a bilateral issue and there can be no gain or benefit by bringing in third parties. In fact, both India and China have categorically refused any mediation.
Q7. There is a consensus that Chinese military power is stronger than that of India’s. How should India proceed to deal with border skirmishes or even with greater conflicts in the future? How prepared are we?
A7: This is not quite within my area of expertise – cannot comment.
Q8. The Chinese market has grown at a rapid pace in the last 20 years to emerge as an important player in the world market. Are these recent developments turned against Chinese interests?
A8: The Galwan clash is unlikely to affect China’s global economic interests. It may in the short to medium term have an impact on India-China economic engagement. Of course, one has to understand this in the context of the larger backdrop of the pandemic and its impact on economies around the world – and the global reaction against China, which is seen as responsible for the spread of Covid 19. There is also a larger discourse about the need to examine the over dependence on China regarding the global value chains, the US-China 'decoupling' and the economic slowdown that China is also undergoing. So, much will depend on how fast economies will recover – and how soon can China bounce back.
Q9. There is a clear division seems to be taking place between the US and China in world politics, if it turns up to be another cold war like situation, what should be India’s stand?
A9: Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar division of the world, a large number of countries, including India found an opportunity to expand their options, free from the confining scenarios of the US-USSR cold war. Calls for a greater democratization of the world order, a turn towards multilateralism and greater scope for middle powers made it extremely advantageous and even liberating for many countries. We are now once again witnessing a transition in international politics. Talking of another cold war – this time between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) dominates the IR discourse.
It may not be very useful – or even appropriate to see the current US-China tensions as another cold war. The important point is that India must not be seen as siding with any one. We have very important and crucial ties with both US and China – and the latter is our neighbor, our largest trading partner and the source of the fastest growing FDI. India has strategic partnerships with both and hence the vital importance of maintaining one’s strategic autonomy, it will also be the the best way to ensure that we are able to secure our national interest without getting entangled in the strategic objectives of other players which may not always accord with our own.
Q10. How does the whole conflict relate to the growing concern about the pandemic in both India and China?
A10: This conflict, in many ways can be seen as having led to a lost opportunity for India and China to lead the fight against the pandemic in Asia and the world. In fact we had seen some extremely useful and positive cooperation between our countries in the initial stages of the pandemic – both in India and China. Each supplied materials, equipment and medicines to deal with the problem. It is also important to bear in mind that we have a near total dependence on China for pharma raw materials used in medicines that are a lifeline for millions of Indians. China is in fact now sending medical teams and material to India’s neighbours, especially Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Had both teamed up with their greater capability and resources and experience to provide the necessary assistance in the broader region, it would have actually lent credence to the notion of India-China partnership as the fulcrum of the Asian century. Instead, with this clash, that idea seems to be in the danger of disintegrating. It is highly uncertain how soon will we be able to put this episode behind us – a tense India-China relationship is not likely to be conducive to regional peace and stability – and could have an inimical impact on the domestic objectives of prioritizing development and modernization.
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Alka Acharya is a Professor of Chinese Studies in the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. She has been teaching courses on Chinese Foreign Policy and Political Economy to the Masters and M.Phil students and guiding doctoral research since 1993. She is also an Honorary Fellow of the Institute of Chinese Studies (New Delhi) and the Editor of China Report, a journal of East Asian Affairs. She is also the joint editor of the book Crossing A Bridge of Dreams: 50 years of India-China, published in 2002, has contributed chapters to many books and regularly features in the Economic and Political Weekly, published from Mumbai, India. She has written widely on India-China Relations and other aspects of China’s foreign policy.
