New Delhi: Defence ministry officials were in a huddle in the national capital's South Block on Friday. On consideration was the all-important question of whether to invite Australia for the 'Malabar Exercise' or not.
"The final decision is still awaited and is expected in the coming weeks. There are several decision-making stages involved. The Indian Navy, the defence ministry, the foreign affairs ministry and then the top level which will take the final nod from the political leadership. As of now, we are at the first and second levels, but at the end of the day it will be a political call," said a military official familiar with the development but not authorized to speak on it.
"The first level of the Navy has no issues at all. After all, there is no problem of interoperability as we are already holding joint exercises with the Australian Navy in AUSINDEX which last year saw the participation of submarines too."
The bilateral India-Australia naval exercise 'USINDEX' began in 2015 but saw its biggest scale-up in 2019.
Malabar Exercise, which began as a bilateral India-US naval exercise in 1992, became a trilateral affair with the entry of Japan in 2015.
Australia and Singapore had joined in as non-permanent members in the 2007 edition of the exercise in the Bay of Bengal which had drawn China’s ire which saw it as an ‘anti-China’ alignment of forces.
Indian Hesitation
While the US and Japan have been more than enthusiastic in roping in Australia, it is India’s reluctance that has prevented the Aussie entry thus far.
The Indian hesitation is because of three main reasons.
Firstly, China has been making no secret of its unhappiness in case the 'Quad' or the alignment of four countries—India, US, Japan and Australia—shapes up. And it is sure to draw Chinese protests and bellicose behaviour this time too. But with India-China ties at a new low because of border tension across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), India may overlook Chinese opposition.
But at the same time, there have been ongoing India-China parleys at the military, diplomatic, special representative and political levels focused on disengagement and de-escalation on the border.
Interestingly, while India’s political leadership has not directly named China till now, President Xi Jinping has also not spoken of the border row which saw its worst form in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh on June 15.
Therefore with both countries pursuing talks, India, like before, may choose not to invite Australia yet again and risk whatever chances of neighbourly relationship exist with China.
Secondly, while Russia has not officially objected to ‘Malabar Ex’ till now, it may this time. Australian entry and the shaping of the ‘Quad’ will immediately erode India’s traditional non-alignment role and position it in the US camp. With Russia-China collaboration already getting stronger, India’s warm relation with Russia may dampen considerably notwithstanding the defence deals.
As of now, the ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ or QSD is an informal strategic grouping between the four that began in 2017.
Thirdly, India is not entirely convinced of Australia’s commitment to a ‘Quad’ alignment. After China’s objections to Australia’s participation in ‘Malabar Ex 2007’, Australia’s foreign minister Stephen Smith had said in a press conference that the exercise was a ‘one-off’ and that ‘Australia would not be proposing to have a dialogue of that nature’ again. That impression of Australia remains a dominant one for India.
But there is no doubting that Australia’s inclusion or exclusion in ‘Malabar 2020’ is a precursor to the positioning of the ‘Quad’ as a new alignment with the potential to reshape geo-strategy at the global level in general and in the Indo-Pacific in particular.
Also Read: India favourably considering Australia's entry into Malabar exercise: Sources
