South Asia continues to be a region of surprises and challenges, often drawing in both regional partners and extra-regional powers in a competitive mix. While the Soviet Union once played a significant role in this part of the world, China is now increasingly filling that space. On the other hand, the US remains a dominant player, indeed a resident power in the region. As regional states have consolidated their power relative to the past and as extra-regional powers have adapted to new global and regional realities, the maritime expanse of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is witnessing more competition. With China’s naval leap and subsequent growth in maritime power projection including in the Indian Ocean, regional powers like India and like-minded partners like Australia, Japan and the US have formed the Quad to deter any unilateral dominance of the IOR.
The recent discussions around St. Martin's Island, prompted by apparent U.S. interest in the Bay of Bengal erroneously reported but certainly merits a critical assessment.
The Bay of Bengal, within the Indian Ocean, is a critical geography with immense strategic importance, especially in naval warfare, where the Strait of Malacca holds a pivotal role, and in terms of maritime trade. The Bay borders several South Asian states, most of which, except India, are grappling with internal turmoil. Nepal is in a near-perpetual state of governance transition, driven largely by an anti-India narrative. Myanmar is engulfed in a civil war, with ongoing conflict between the military junta and rebel forces. The most recent state to spiral into crisis is Bangladesh, raising questions about the future of democracy in Asia. Amidst this complex web of relationships, governance structures, and competing interests, India stands firm in its ability to address challenges internally and provide a stable foundation for democracy despite external challenges.
Great power politics in South Asia have historically been marked by complex relationships, where regional democracies often resisted the intrusion of great power competition into their backyard. During the Cold War, the competing dynamics of the U.S. and the Soviet Union played out in the Indian Ocean region, making regional countries uncomfortable with the global power struggle within their own domain. This discomfort led to a collective petition by regional countries at the United Nations for a "zone of peace" resolution, aiming to keep the Indian Ocean free from great power competition. Although the U.S.-Soviet rivalry manifested in the Indian Ocean, it did so more cautiously than in the Atlantic and Pacific, particularly during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.
Since the turn of the century, the global order has changed significantly, as has the position of South Asia and the relative influence of great powers like the United States, Russia, and China. The U.S. remains a predominant player in the Indian Ocean, with its Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, a naval facility in Djibouti, and its Southern Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia. The Bay of Bengal and the eastern part of the Indian Ocean fall under the area of responsibility of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, based in Japan. These facilities establish the United States as a resident power in the Indian Ocean, despite its geographical distance from the region.
However, the evolving geopolitics and the shifting balance of power, with a shifting Russia and a rising China, have changed the dynamics of great power involvement. The United States' Indo-Pacific Strategy reflects this shift, as it increasingly allows regional partners like India to take the lead in shaping the security environment. This strategy marks a departure from the classic Cold War geopolitics, adapting to a tech-driven world order where equity of power is prioritized over regional dominance. The Indo-Pacific Strategy is still evolving, aiming to establish a framework in which only those countries that adhere to the rules gain membership in the commune of the equity of power, while those that violate regional and global norms, such as China, are treated as competitors or adversaries.
The recent discussions around St. Martin's Island, prompted by apparent U.S. interest in the Bay of Bengal, are understandable from a strategic standpoint. However, within the context of the evolving power dynamics, regional security, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it is unlikely that the U.S. will move forward with establishing another military base in the Bay of Bengal. If the Indo-Pacific Strategy is any indication, the U.S. will likely continue to allow regional partners like India to take the lead in critical areas like the Bay of Bengal, while playing a supportive role in boosting regional capacities in surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance. This approach is expected to function as a general rule than any exception.
Even without a military base in the Bay of Bengal, the U.S. retains the capability to deploy forces quickly in the region. Establishing a new naval facility, however, could ruffle feathers, not only with China but also with regional partners like India, given that Bangladesh and Myanmar—both of which share borders with India—are strong partners but are currently experiencing political turmoil. The U.S. and India have somewhat different perspectives on the path forward for these countries, adding another layer of complexity.
In conclusion, the downsides of developing another military facility in the Indian Ocean outweigh the benefits. The political instability in Bangladesh and Myanmar should be a clear indicator that this may not be the right time to establish a new military support facility in the region. The U.S. would be better served by leveraging existing facilities on both sides of the Bay of Bengal and allowing regional players like India to take the lead in ensuring security and stability in the Indian Ocean.
