Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council: Waxing and Waning

Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister YS Jagan Mohan Reddy moving a resolution to abolish the state Legislative Council has triggered debate on the relevance of the upper house of state legislature. In this article, Vivek K. Agnihotri, the former Secretary-General of the Rajya Sabha, explains that Legislative Councils do not enjoy the same power as the upper house of India's Parliament, and how proper restructuring is required to make them more relevant today.

The Proposal

On 27 January 2020, the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly (APLA) adopted a Statutory Resolution recommending abolition of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council (APLC) to the Parliament of India. Ironically, in seeking this abolition, Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, has taken a leaf out of the book of N. T. Rama Rao, the founder of Telugu Desam Party, the main party in opposition at present. Rama Rao had successfully abolished the APLC (Upper House of the State Legislature) in 1985. A greater irony lies in the fact that the Legislative Council was subsequently revived in 2007, by no other person than Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy, father of Jagan Mohan Reddy.

Replying to the discussion on the Resolution, Jagan Mohan Reddy said that the APLC had lost 'public utility' and become a white elephant. He justified the move on the ground that it was obstructing the decentralised development of the State by obstructing the passage of Andhra Pradesh Decentralisation and Inclusive Development of All Regions (APDIDAR) Bill, 2020 and the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority (APCRDA) Repeal Bill, 2020. The second Bill has sought repeal of the Act which sought to give shape to the grandiose project of his predecessor, N. Chandrababu Naidu, to found Amaravati, as the capital of the reorganised Andhra Pradesh. The first Bill seeks to implement the unique idea of decentralised development, propagated by Jagan Mohan Reddy, by setting up three capitals of the State at Visakhapatnam (executive), Kurnool (judicial) and Amaravati (legislative). After the Bills were passed by the APLA, the APLC had referred them to its Select Committee for examination and report.

Legislative Councils in the States

As a Constitutional body, the Legislative Council in Andhra Pradesh as well as several other States of India has had a chequered history. The APLC was first set up in 1958 on the basis of a resolution of the APLA of 1956. As mentioned earlier, N. T. Rama Rao, founder of the Telugu Desam in 1982, got the APLC abolished in 1985. He described it an un-productive burden on the exchequer, an un-elected and un-representative body used to distribute political favours to out-of-work politicians, and the cause of delays in passing purposeful legislation, more or less the arguments advanced more than three decades later by an unlikely follower, Jagan Mohan Reddy. After a failed attempt, the APLC was revived in 2007 by YSR Reddy.

Read: AP Cabinet okays resolution to abolish Legislative Council

At present, after the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 (inter alia abolishing the Legislative Council of the State) there are only six states that have a Legislative Council, namely Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Telangana and Uttar Pradesh. In Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed in 1956 to establish a Legislative Council, but the notification to give effect to it is yet to come. Proposals to create Legislative Councils in Rajasthan and Assam are pending in Parliament.

Post independence, Legislative Councils have been abolished, after initial establishment, in Punjab (1970), Tamil Nadu (1986) and West Bengal (1969). In 2010, following the passing of a resolution by the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu for the revival of the Legislative Council, the Parliament enacted a law for the purpose. However, before the Act could be notified, the new Legislative Assembly (with the changed ruling party) passed another resolution in 2011 seeking the abolition of the proposed Legislative Council. Accordingly, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Council (Repeal) Bill, 2012 was also introduced in the Rajya Sabha on May 4, 2012, as a measure of abundant precaution, perhaps. Tamil Nadu, therefore, at present, does not have a Legislative Council.

Constitutional Provisions

This waxing and waning of Legislative Councils in the States is, to a large extent, due to a weak provision for them in the Constitution of India. Unlike the Council of States (Rajya Sabha), the Upper House in the Parliament of India, Legislative Councils at the State level are not mandatory. According to clause (1) of article 169, the Parliament may by law provide for creation and abolition of the Legislative Council of a State, if the Legislative Assembly of the State passes a resolution to that effect by a special majority, i.e. by a majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting. Thus creation and abolition of a Legislative Council in a State is optional. Moreover, on account of “may” in the clause, the Parliament is not bound to act on the resolution of the State. Further, since article 168 lists the names of the States which have two Houses, every time a Legislative Council is created or abolished, this article needs to be modified. In this context, clause (3) of article 169 provides that these changes can be carried out without having to follow the procedure prescribed in article 368 for amendment of the Constitution.

As regards the legislative procedure, the Legislative Council is on par with the Rajya Sabha in so far as passing of Bills, other than the money Bills, requires approval of both the Houses. But it does not have similar powers as far as amendments to and rejection of such Bills is concerned. If the Assembly rejects the amendments suggested by the Council or the Council rejects the bill altogether or the Council does not take any action for three months, then the Assembly may pass the bill again and transmit it to the Council. If the Council rejects the bill again or passes the bill with amendments not acceptable to the Assembly or does not pass the bill within one month, then the bill is deemed to have been passed by both the Houses in the form in which it was passed by the Assembly for the second time. A time limit has been prescribed for consideration and passage of Bills only by the Legislative Council; whereas in the Parliament it applies to both the Houses. Thus, there is no provision for a joint sitting of both the Houses (article 108) for settlement of unresolved differences on a Bill or if a Bill, passed by one House, is not passed by the other House within the prescribed time limit.

Read: Hurdle for Jagan's '3-capital' move as AP Council adopts TDP resolution

The composition of the Legislative Council can be varied by the Parliament through a law, whereas in the case of the Rajya Sabha, the Constitution itself provides for it. Unlike the Rajya Sabha, again, the members of the Legislative Council are not part of the electoral college for the elections to the posts of the President and the vice President of India.

The constitutional provisions, of course, reflect the division of opinion in the Constituent Assembly itself on the subject of a second chamber in the States. The criticism of the provision was on the same lines on which NT Rama Rao had earlier and Jagan Mohan Reddy has now sought the abolition of the Legislative Council. Thus, some members of the Constituent Assembly felt that the second chamber in the State was not representative of the people, would delay legislative process and was an expensive proposition.

The Emerging Scenario in Andhra Pradesh

Against this backdrop, what is the likely scenario now? Since the APLA has passed the resolution for abolition of the APLC, the ball is in the court of the Parliament of India. However, as mentioned above, the Parliament is not bound to act on the resolution. Even if, as is expected, the legislation is put forth in the Parliament, given its present preoccupations and priorities during the Budget Session, and the fact that the Parliament will be in recess from 12 February to 1 March, it may take some time to get it through, unless it is prioritised.

If, on the other hand, the APLC within the prescribed time limit of three months returns the two Bills (APDIDAR and APCRDA) with its comments / amendments, APLA would have two reconsider the matter. If the Bills are again passed by the APLA, with or without accepting any of the changes proposed by APLC, they will land up in the office of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh for his assent. The provisions of articles 200 and 201 would then come into play. According to article 200, the Governor may declare that he reserves the Bills for the consideration of the President. In such a situation, the President may either give his assent to the Bills or withhold his assent to the Bills or return the Bills for reconsideration of the Houses within a period of six months. In case the Bills are returned for reconsideration, they shall be presented again to the President for assent after they have been passed by the House or the Houses (if the APLC is not abolished by then). It is not mentioned in the Constitution whether it is obligatory on the part of the President to give his assent to Bills reserved for his consideration.

Relevance of the Upper House

The debate regarding relevance of the second chamber is perhaps as old as the second chamber itself. The story goes that in the late 18th century, when the American constitutional framework was on the anvil, Thomas Jefferson one day protested to George Washington at the breakfast table against the establishment of two houses in the legislature.
Washington asked him, "Why do you pour that coffee into your saucer?"
"To cool it," replied Jefferson.
"Even so," said Washington, "we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it."

Read: Jammu & Kashmir legislative council abolished

There was much debate among the framers of the Indian Constitution on the role and functions of the Upper House. The debates of the Constituent Assembly are witness to the fact that despite opposition in certain quarters, most members favoured a second chamber because they felt that erudite members of the Rajya Sabha, who are not trapped in the political thicket like the members of the Lok Sabha, would view legislation more dispassionately. The most vociferous supporter of the idea of the second chamber was N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who had moved the resolution. He said that the second chamber would ensure “dignified debates”, and it would “delay legislation” until “the passions of the moment have subsided.'' He added that the second chamber is “an instrument by which we delay action” and also give an opportunity to the “seasoned people”, who bring their learning to the House. Lok Nath Mishra described it as “a sobering House, a reviewing House, a House standing for quality and the members will be exercising their right to be heard on the merits of what they say, for their sobriety and knowledge of special problems…” M. Ananthsayanam Ayyangar thought that in such a platform of reflective consideration “the genius of people may have full play”, and it can make place for people “who may not be able to win popular mandate”.

On the other hand, Mohd. Tahir was of the view that the idea of an Upper House was thought of by the British as an imperialist tool to impede the work of a democratically elected House. Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena said that in no country had the Upper House helped progress.

Way Ahead: Reimaging Legislative Councils

As far as the Legislative Councils in the States are concerned, their composition appears to be somewhat outdated and somewhat flawed in the present context. Providing representation to groups like graduates and teachers does not make sense today. Having made the provision for Panchayats and Municipal Bodies in the Constitution, through the Constitutional 73rd and 74th amendments, it is time that the Parliament, in exercise of the powers vested with it in clause (2) of article 171, makes a law to align the composition of the Legislative Councils with the third tier of government in order to provide an organic linkage between the two. Other professional interests could be represented through the quota reserved for nomination by the Governor.

Such a restructuring would not only add value to the deliberations of the Legislative Councils, as envisage by the framers of the Constitution, but also persuade more States to come forward to establish Legislative Councils. It would also, perhaps, make for greater permanence of these bodies.