Mystery of China's shifting generals in Western Theatre

Not all’s well in China's increasingly important Western Theatre, resulting in a sudden and frequent change of commanders with the fourth one taking over recently in less than ten months, writes senior journalist Sanjib Kr Baruah.

New Delhi:The perplexing change of the commanders for China’s Western Theatre (WT) has been happening at too fast and furious a pace. If anything, it is a pointer to the vital fact that whatever is happening in the WT is not to Beijing's liking and in conformity with the strategic line of thinking. And with the WT growing in importance, there is a hurried need to find the best man for the best job.

With the recent taking over of WT by General Wang Haijiang, the command has seen four generals at the helm in less than 10 months.

Of all the five theatres, the WT is the PLA’s biggest theatre geographically by far and possibly the most troublesome as this command is responsible for the India, Afghanistan, South Asia and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) fronts besides handling what China terms as "counterterrorism" in Xinjiang and Tibet.

While Gen Wang is eminently qualified for the job having commanded both the Tibet Military District (TMD) and the Xinjiang Military District, he replaced Gen Xu Qiling who had just taken two months ago in July 2021.

Just 58, Gen Wang is likely to head the WT for a long tenure. In the PLA, generals retire at 65 years.

Gen Xu had taken over from Gen Zhang Xudong who was appointed on December 19, 2020, to replace Gen Zhao Zongqi who had retired at 65. It was during Gen Zhao’s tenure in May 2020 that the India-China border faceoff began with a series of violent fistfights on the banks of the Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh. These changes bear the stamp of President Xi Jinping who is also the chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC).

While these decisions reflect the growing importance of the WT, several factors could have contributed to these rapid changes. Firstly, the India-China standoff in eastern Ladakh is far from resolved. On the contrary, Asia’s two biggest militaries now face each other across the border in an unprecedented escalation. About 1,00,000 soldiers stand deployed across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by both sides along with their warlike equipment.

Although there have been a couple of disengagements from eyeball-to-eyeball face-off positions, for all practical purposes, the entire region, of extreme and difficult terrain, now stands permanently militarized, needing special care and attention, something the past commanders may not have been able to handle.

Secondly, recent developments in Afghanistan where the Taliban has overthrown the earlier Ashraf Ghani government have induced a belief that the Uighur-Muslim insurgents of the East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) may raise their level of activity in China’s Uighur region. There are expected spillover effects from other Islamist terror groups from Af-Pak and Central Asia. This demands a specialized understanding of the insurgency dynamics of the entire region.

About one million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and others belonging to the Muslim faith are reported to have been arbitrarily held in internment camps in Xinjiang on the ground of the government combating terrorism and extremism.

Thirdly, the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will pass through the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) region even as there is some traction in extending branches of the project to Afghanistan. From China's point of view, such an effort will have strategic, economic and military ramifications, which makes the WT much important than ever before.

Fourthly, reports speak about President Xi’s increasing concern over the fact that not many Tibetans are joining the PLA in good numbers. Tibet and Xinjiang have been receiving the special focus of late, as illustrated by Beijing’s recent white papers on these two regions that attempted to showcase the developments these two regions have undergone.

Interestingly, President Xi made a sudden visit to the Tibet region on July 22 and 23 when he visited the border city of Nyingchi and then to Lhasa as he posed with the common people with the Potala Palace, the Dalai Lama’s official residence, looming large in the backdrop.

This was Xi’s first visit to Tibet as President. He had last visited the region in 2011 when he was the vice-president.

Fifthly, it is the WT from where China’s newly-developed routes to access the waters of the Indian Ocean begin through Pakistan and Myanmar thereby enabling China to overcome the 'Malaccan dilemma'. Routes to the sea will make it imperative for greater control of the areas through which the access is gained.

Sixthly, as General Rakesh Sharma, who commanded the Fire and Fury Corps in Ladakh and is a keen China watcher and analyst, points out, Chinese President Xi may be consolidating his position. "Gen Wang was sent to Xinjiang early in 2021 possibly to get the requisite knowledge. Previously he was a deputy and also a commander in the Tibet Military Region. Also, the political commissar also changed in June, President Xi has brought in a new commander of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF) too. That is meaningful too."

On September 6, besides announcing Gen Wang as the WT commander, China had also made official the naming of Gen Lin Xiangyang as the Central Theater commander, Gen Dong Jun as the navy commander and Gen Chang Dingqiu as the air force commander.

Adding that President Xi may be replacing top positions in the PLA with people he can trust and depend upon, Gen Sharma adds that Gen Wang has got close links with the Communist Party.

In 2015 and early 2016, replacing the earlier seven army-based military regions, China established five theatre commands — Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central — placing them under the powerful CMC and organised on the basis of China's perception of peripheral threats.

The WT comprises two group armies, other Army units under the region's two military districts (Xinjiang and Tibet), three Air Force bases, and one Rocket Force base besides overall control over the People’s Armed Police (PAP).