India's foreign policy facing taxing times

With the global geopolitical environment in a pulsating mode amid emerging flashpoints, India’s foreign policy faces tough times that will fully test the Indian positions of non-alignment and strategic autonomy, writes ETV Bharat's Sanjib Kr Baruah.

New Delhi: With the stated traditional Indian positions of non-alignment and strategic autonomy in its foreign affairs gradually losing legitimacy in a changing global order, India’s stand on several key issues is bearing close scrutiny with pressure from both US and Russia to make a choice soon.

There is tremendous pressure on the mandarins managing India’s foreign policy in South Block to take decisive positions on several issues that are beginning to define the contours of a new global order characterised by the emergence of China as a superpower and the gradual shaping of blocks—one led by the US and another by China-Russia.

Ukraine-Russia

India has been non-committal on its policy on the brewing Ukraine crisis that may spill over any time now. With Russia embarking on a huge military buildup on the Russia-Ukraine borders as well as in the littoral waters, war clouds are gathering with US-led NATO forces also mobilizing in proportionate strength.

India faces a piquant situation as Russia has been India’s tried and tested friend for the last eight decades. Now the deep cooperation has further been extended to 2031 by an agreement in December 2021. About 60 percent of Indian weapons, platforms and systems are already of Russian origin.

On the other hand, Ukraine, a dedicated supplier for spares and parts of many Indian military equipment and platforms—a legacy of the Soviet-era relationship with India—is being propped up by the US-led NATO, making it difficult for India to pick and choose.

Till now, India has maintained a studied silence on the war of words between the US and Russia on Ukraine. India’s non-committal stand on Ukraine is also the result why the Quad joint statement on Friday (February 11, 2022) after the meeting of foreign ministers of US, India, Japan and Australia in Melbourne did not have any reference on Ukraine.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)

It is believed one of the reasons why Quad did not take off as envisaged was a marked reluctance on part of India—much to US consternation—to take a frontal bellicose stand against China and to put it in the distance with Russia. That is why the US criticizes India from time to time.

On Friday (February 11, 2022) again, Rashad Hussain, the US Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, criticized India in an unusually sternly-worded stand on the growing controversy over wearing of the ‘hijab’ by Indian Muslim women. He tweeted: “Religious freedom includes the ability to choose one's religious attire… Hijab bans in schools violate religious freedom and stigmatize and marginalize women and girls.”

Another indication of the delicateness in India-US ties would be the fact that the US is yet to issue a waiver of India buying the powerful S-400 air defence system from Russia. Besides India license-producing the Russian Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft, the T-90 tank, and the Brahmos missile collaboration, India and Russia launched another JV in 2019 called the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited to mass-produce the AK-203 assault rifle.

In 2020, a technology development contract was signed between DRDO and Russia’s Rosoboronexport to develop advanced pyrotechnic ignition systems to power rockets and missiles.

On the other hand, India has inked key foundational agreements with the US that tie it militarily very close to the US. These pacts are the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), signed in 2016, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) of 2018 and the BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) of 2020.

LEMOA allows mutual use of military facilities while COMCASA allows US to station communication equipment in India besides secure transmission and real-time exchange of military data and information. BECA will give India access to the much advanced and accurate US geo-spatial data including digital imagery and maps—imperative to operate UAVs.

It is obvious that there is pressure on India exerted by US and Russia to choose its side.

Myanmar’s military junta

For India's flagship Act East Policy (AEP), Myanmar holds a pivotal position. It is through Myanmar that India seeks access to Indo-China and the Far East. Moreover, India's friendly overtures worked with Naypwidaw and were fetching dividends in the form of active cooperation by the ‘Tatmadaw’ (the military regime) in fighting the insurgents from Northeast India.

But that was until the coup of February 1, 2021.

The coup and subsequent developments has presented a huge dilemma for the Indian establishment—should it support the ‘Tatmadaw’ and hence the brutal crackdown on the pro-democracy forces, or should it voice support for the people’s mass movement?

Supporting the ‘Tatmadaw’—while being a contradiction of India’s pro-democratic ideological position, will annoy the US and the West besides strengthening China that is hell-bent on extending its transportation infrastructure right up to the Bay of Bengal.

On the other hand, opposing the military junta will be a huge boost to the weakening insurgency movements originating from Northeast India that will be sheltered and aided in different ways by the junta and by proxy, China.

Iran and West Asia

Historically, based on shared cultural heritage and commonalities, Iran had been one of India’s closest friends in West Asia and the fulcrum of India’s resistance to the Pakistan-led effort to bring the Kashmir issue to the limelight especially in the Muslim world among the member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Moreover, Iran with huge assets in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, was the veritable hinge for Indian interests to flourish in Afghanistan which was the Gateway to Central Asia where India had always looked for strong presence. In fact, India’s presence in the Chabahar project was to help access Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.

Economically too, Iran was willing to sell petrol to India in Indian currency. But because of US sanctions, India had stopped buying of Iranian oil and instead started buying US oil, thereby distancing Iran.

The widening India-Iran gulf also led to an unprecedented and vehement protest by Iran on India’s abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir.

The gap left by Iran in the matrix of Indian foreign policy remains unfilled, resulting in waning Indian influence in West Asia.