In insurgency-hit NE India, war has ceased, battle has begun

The Indian Army’s nature and scope of counter insurgency operations has changed in the core zone of four Upper Assam districts and nearby areas of Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, marking a decisive turn in the fight against insurgency, writes Sanjib Kr Baruah.

Dinjan, Laipuli, Digboi (Upper Assam): Like the unchanging ubiquitous humid air of the region, the air of suspicion and uncertainty still hangs around like a heavy wet blanket in the Upper Assam insurgency hub of Dibrugarh and Tinsukia. Yet certain things have changed from the times when insurgency peaked in the state in the 1990s.

What has changed is the easy confidence with which counter-insurgency personnel from the Indian Army and the paramilitary Assam Rifles move around and interact with locals who have borne the brunt of insurgency and became unwilling victims. This was not possible some years ago.

A Lull

Based on empirical research and evidence, scholars believe insurgency has an average lifespan of 60 years. While the Naga underground movement—that began in the 1950s and 1960s—has exceeded the average, whether the Assam insurgency—ULFA was formed in 1979—gets to live it out is a question worth pondering.

While internal divisions and dissensions have wracked the ULFA, the Paresh Baruah-led faction is plagued by lack of resources. The Arabindo Rajkhowa faction of the ULFA is pursuing talks with the government even as Baruah leads a few hundreds of armed fighters from jungle camps inside Myanmar bordering India.

The Naga insurgency, led by the dominant NSCN factions, is clearly on the backfoot in the backdrop of protracted negotiations with the government that has continued for the last 25 years.

The apparent lack of insurgent activity has given rise to a period of lull that may be deceptive, but there are indications it may be not.

Said Brigadier Kirpal Gill, leading the 73 Mountain Brigade headquartered in Laipuli: “Insurgency has waned and the counter to it has also changed. It is a whole-of-the-nation approach now. Now the battle is for the mind-space.”

Brigadier Gill listed three main reasons why we think ULFA insurgency is petering out: “Firstly, recruitment has come down, second, desertions have increased and third, the source of funds have dried up leading to a money crunch for the Paresh Baruah-led ULFA faction.”

At the same time, there is no let-up in the Army’s counter-insurgency effort with a small dedicated force still focused on area familiarization, area domination, and mounting mobile check-posts to undertake what are “intelligence-based ethical operations.”

Major-General MS Bains, General-Officer-Commanding of the 2 Mountain Division, said with the changing times the orientation of the forces has also changed with counter-insurgency operations being largely mandated to the Assam Rifles.

Gen Bains added that the Indian Army is now undertaking a major “reorientation” and “rebalancing” after being primarily tasked with responsibility for the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China in Arunachal Pradesh.

Soft Power Projection

While the ‘battle for the hearts and minds’ is a much overused cliché, it is a serious tactic in the Northeast and the Indian Army has unleashed its soft power to the fullest.

The focus and soft power projection has assumed many forms and dimensions—including running an impressive free residential coaching centre that trains students from underprivileged backgrounds to prepare for exams like engineering, medical entrance tests while another programme for NDA entrance exams is being mulled.

Given the natural inclination and sporting ability of the locals, the Army is also catering to provision of sports facilities. In the absence of proper medical amenities, the military also runs regular medical camps for the benefit of locals in the area where medicines are also provided.

Conducive Topography

The four districts of Dibrugarh Sibsagar, Tinsukia and Charaideo form the core of ULFA-led insurgency activity in the state because of the fact that besides being endowed with huge natural resources from tea to oil, it is in proximity to the Nagaland and the three insurgency-hit districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding in Arunachal Pradesh located on the fringes of Myanmar.

Moreover, this particular area has lush green vegetation that changes into dense and thick forests extending right into the Myanmar forests which have been a historic haven for insurgents from India’s Northeast, primarily because Naypyitaw doesn’t exercise any effective control over this huge swath.

This largely ungoverned tract spans about 1,300 km in length from north in Arunachal Pradesh to Assam to the south across Manipur, and with an average width of about 50 km till the Chindwin river in Myanmar, the region is about 60,000 sq km in size.

Despite the logistics and tactics in place, there is also a realization even within the security establishment, that the military effort to counter insurgency is also a temporary measure.

Said one top security official on condition of anonymity: “There is no doubt that insurgency in the region has a solution only in the realm of politics and only a political solution will put a permanent end to the problem. Till then, despite the present lull, the uncertainty over the future will prevail.”