Agnipath Revisited With Malice To None

Lieutenant General (Retired) Kammula Ramachandra Rao writes about the changes in the Agnipath which are brought about by the Narendra Modi-led government. Agniveer was a scheme brought out by the Centre for the Armed Forces.

Countries maintain large armies with a motive to emerge as a super or regional power or out of compulsions of the geography of long unguarded borders or dictated by unfriendly neighbours. Inspite of the best of efforts in a very sophisticated foreign policy appreciated by many countries, we are one such nation where we are compelled to maintain large Armed Forces more out of compulsions of not only unfriendly but also troublesome neighbours.

However, in our endeavour to continuously cut down on the defence expenditure for various other facets of the development of the nation, we must always plan and optimise our defence expenditure. Hence, it is imperative that the right structures are maintained in our armed forces.

Now coming closer to the subject under discussion, in that direction, the Agnipath scheme which was introduced two years back is now being revisited and the government is attempting to make certain modifications which certainly is a positive and welcome step. The fact whether it was necessitated due to the restlessness or dissatisfaction by the aspiring youth, or the internal dynamics and problems being faced by the armed forces in training and war preparedness or the catalytic process initiated by the allies of the BJP is immaterial at this point of time and is out of context. We do need to understand the problems, find suitable solutions, and move ahead. Hopefully, some of these changes being looked at are positive and would address a large number of issues flagged by many.

Reinforcing Failure

History is forgotten, and we are in the habit of reinventing the wheel. So, before we understand the changes, it is important to go into a bit of the past. For want of better understanding and terminology, the phrase "Reinforcing Failure" has been used as this is what is best understood by the armed forces.

It was sometime in 2004, that Ajay Vikram Singh Committee (AVSC) constituted by then government, which had recommended restructuring of the Armed Forces officers' cadre. We will not dwell into other controversial issues which had been raised by some but let us focus on the core issue of the study by the committee which was that the ratio of regular officers versus short service commissioned officers (support cadre) which was to be pegged at 1:1.1, respectively.

It aimed at a young and dynamic cutting edge with assured career progression for the permanent cadre. Various recommendations had been given to attain the same, with the central focus being that a good exit policy of the support cadre will pave the way for a good entrance.

It had recommended a large number of measures to make the exit of short service officers attractive and meaningful based on which they expected that the support cadre would grow. However, despite the best of their efforts by the government at that point of time, it made no headway. We continue to remain a ratio of 4:1 or so of Regulars vs Support cadre.

Thereafter some of the good measures of exit for the support cadre were also recommended again in 5th and 6th pay commissions but to no avail. This very AVSC recommendation was looking at restructuring an officer cadre of around 50,000 of the Army, Navy and Air Force put together. Strangely, the same could never be put into effect.

So, the moot question is that while such an attempt addressing around 50,000 officers could not be achieved in the past 15 to 20 years by previous governments, taking the same route was bound to face a host of hurdles right from the inception. In the form the Agnipath model was presented, with no written assurances, it was quite clear from the very beginning that it would be quite unappealing, and it warranted a review soonest. One is happy to see it happening now and the government needs to be complimented for the same.

Study by 6th Central Pay Commission

It is interesting to recapitulate a study which was a prelude to the submission of the Commission report. If we are interested in the reduction of expenditure both by the defence forces and ever-increasing numbers of paramilitary forces, there is a need for both defence and home ministries to sit together and arrive at a full cost optimisation.

Presently, armed forces and paramilitary forces have their own organisations and processes for the recruitment of personnel. In addition, they have full-fledged training centres with allied material and instructors independently. The model in the 6th Central Pay Commission recommended or looked at recruitment being centralised through the armed forces and thereafter a certain number of Army personnel varying from service of 4 to 10 years be laterally absorbed on a permanent basis into the paramilitary forces. The personnel being offered for absorption varied from average to outstanding performers in a set proportion.

This proposal what was expected to be a game changer in terms of saving to the exchequer and indeed had the distinct advantage of getting trained manpower who needed a little more specialised training which was peculiar to the para-military force. This, however, did not see the light of day for assorted reasons of which the biggest as perceived by me was the loss of empire by some and the lack of a cogent approach with a firm central drive. Maybe there is certainly a need to have a De-Nova look at the same.

Envisaged Changes

From what we see in the open domain, we find that the possible changes to the scheme which have been planned by the present government are as under-.

• An increase in the retentions of Agniveers from existing four to a bracket of 4-8 years. (Positive useful step both from the overall satisfaction of Agniveers and for the Armed Forces.
• Increase in the retention of Agniveers from the existing 25% to around 70 or 75%. (Again, a welcome step which is in tune with the existing officer’s cadre principle.)
• Adequate compensation to the Agniveers for various contingencies both in peace and war. (Needs adequate deliberations but the need to always cater for inflation, which does not happen.)
• Ensuring adequate vacancies are created in lateral absorption post-release of Agniveers. (This should not remain on paper or executed for limited periods based on personalities driving the same but must be gazette notified, and an audit and accountability be built in.)
• Increasing training period where required thus offsetting the earlier retrograde step. (It is no rocket science to state the obvious that the present Commanding Officers cannot give the same focus of training as was being done in the centres and make up the same by on job training with all the ever-growing commitments both in peace and in field.)
• Logical to tweak some ages especially technical trades as also to make up deficiencies and to cater for earlier shortcoming of the scheme.

Deficiencies in Armed Forces

Since no recruitment was conducted for two consecutive years, the Army alone would have a deficiency of approximately 1.2 or 1.3 lakhs. This is based on an average of 60,000 to 65,000 retirements/inductions annually. Based on the assumption that the Indian Army manpower was to be brought back to its original strength of 13,00,000, it would take a minimum of 4 to 5 years for the same, taking into consideration the retirements over the next 4 years too. It must therefore be very clearly understood that by tinkering with the present system without giving adequate thought of induction and training has resulted in a piquant situation which was avoidable.

Bulges in Manpower Planning

Bulges in intake will create problems. A small example for those who have forgotten the commissioning of officers more than planned in a year during 1999 Kargil War. Officers were affected for promotions and management was difficult and had to be cautiously regulated. Some of the affected who may have retired by now are privy to the same. That was for just one year and one additional course. Imagine that such tinkering of sudden intake of 1.2 -1.3 lakh persons per year for about 5 years the magnitude of bulges that would be created in a smooth regular structure. It will have an impact on the terms and conditions of these years' batches, quality of intakes, training etc. It will affect the promotional avenues. These bulges will be a cyclic recurring after every 15 years or so again affecting the regular functioning of training centres. The Armed forces will need to analyse the same and have a very controlled and well-monitored mechanism of releases and tinker with the same year after year whenever these bulges are created.

Strain on Training Infrastructure for Enhanced Induction

The present training centres of various Arms and Services cater to train around 60 to 65,000 recruits per year, which can certainly be beefed up marginally maybe another 30 per cent, since all the training centres do have a brick system of authorisation of instructors, manpower and allied facilities for the same. With a pinch, even the infrastructure has the resilience to take the additional load. Having tinkered with the existing structure and induction schedule, there will be a need to double the induction per year from 60,000/65,000 to 1,20,00/1,25,000 for a few years. This will have its own serious ramifications on the already available resources with the centres and maybe to some extent even in the quality of training.

Skewed Structures

When we carry out a simple modelling of the likely outcome of tinkering with the time-tested model, it is likely that for some time maybe to the tune of 8 to 10 years the structures in various battalions and regiments may get a little skewed and basic structures at section, platoon, company levels may be distorted. It is quite likely that while there will be adequate or more than adequate numbers in the higher echelons of ranks, it is quite likely that there will be few voids in the middle-level ranks. This issue will have to be studied in detail, borne in mind, and managed with caution and more importantly, understanding by the cutting-edge leaders of commanding officers and below is of paramount importance.

Services will need to use the tool of extension of service ranging from 4 to 8 years intelligently by regulating the numbers of releases at varying services so that the structures and intake are brought into a steady state soonest.

Lateral Absorption

It was interesting to find video clips of various Director Generals of paramilitary forces promising lateral absorption of the released Agniveers. Although a good two years have passed since the introduction of the Agnipath scheme, no Gazette notifications or published material is available in the open domain of the assurances made earlier by the concerned directorates to the concerned departments and by the ministries. One is not privy to any published material or a gazette notification in support of the promises of lateral absorption, subject to correction. This may be so because there is still time for the release of the first batch of Agniveers.

Similar is the case with the list of 150-odd establishments which are being quoted in various forums of having agreed to give openings to the released Agniveer. It is high time that such notifications are released and brought into the public domain failing which these promises might remain like the election promises of many parties of our country.

The service rendered by the Agniveers must be safeguarded and given the benefit of service rendered for seniority in the organisations absorbing them when absorbed.

Leave and Other Terms in Service

All conditions such as leave etc must be as earlier prior to the introduction of the Agnipath Scheme and trying to cut down leave to 30 days etc are detrimental to the health of troops. It is a bad hygiene recommendation. Interestingly, even Short Service Officers have no differences in this score. If so, why create these at the soldier level by differentiating?

Conclusion

Change Management is especially important when we are dealing with human beings. HR policies since most are affected by the same and a fair number are averse to change. It is a well-known fact that a Good Decision is a function of the Quality of the Decision and Acceptability by the Stakeholders. Hence, we need to look at the same, understand and bring about the change in a gradual manner. A little more deliberation with the affected and especially the Veterans would have rightly made the present changes easier to manage and foreseen these well in time.

Some more deliberations will be needed to further streamline the processes for the induction of Agniveers. A suggestion towards the same is to collate recommendations from the environment in an open manner through a common e-mail and not stick to recommendations submitted through the laid down channel of command. This would open some more ideas. The same was resorted to in the 6th Pay Commission by the Armed Forces with a common e-mail for recommendations to get more ideas.

The government in charge needs to be congratulated for understanding the need for changes in the existing scheme and making good efforts to improve the same. Armed Forces too need to take the inputs post-introduction of this scheme and pave the way for the success of the scheme. They must get the best out of the changes forced upon, to their advantage to ensure that operational efficiency is not compromised at any stage.

At the end of the day, irrespective of what changes are being deliberated and implemented, the organisation solely responsible for the security of the nation is the Armed Forces. Like good soldiers, in the interest of National Security, we must continue to err on the positive side and avoid sycophancy at all costs.